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"TAKE OR PAY" CONTRACT FOR ELECTRIC POWER AS ANTIMONOPOLY MEASURE IN THE "DAY AHEAD" MARKET
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"TAKE OR PAY" CONTRACT FOR ELECTRIC POWER AS ANTIMONOPOLY MEASURE IN THE "DAY AHEAD" MARKET
Annotation
PII
S042473880000616-6-1
Publication type
Article
Status
Published
Authors
Vadim Borokhov 
Edition
Volume 46 Issue 1
Pages
12-26
Abstract
We propose algorithm of structuring an electric power delivery contract of "take or pay" type for a generator with market power in the "day ahead" electric power market, which - under the general conditions - ensures that generator's dominating bidding strategy in the "day ahead" market is equivalent to its dominating bidding strategy in the market with perfect competition. In a general case, contracted amount of electric power and (or) contract price depend on the amount of electric power production planned for such a generator in the "day ahead" market. We study the conditions of stability of the proposed method under deviation of the estimated parameters in the contract set up from their actual values. Such contracts can be applied in electric power markets to mitigate market power of electricity generators in the "day ahead" market of electric power.
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Date of publication
01.01.2010
Number of purchasers
2
Views
779
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0.0 (0 votes)
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